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LEGISLATION
The 1966 Amendment to the Bank Merger Act:
Economic Perspective and Legal Analysis
I. INTRODUCION
In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,' the Supreme Court
enjoined a proposed merger of the second and third largest commercial
banks in Philadelphia. The Court held, inter alia, that section 7 of the
Clayton Act 2 applied to bank mergers,3 and that the merger in question
might substantially lessen competition. 4 Central to the reasoning of
the majority was the premise that an unchecked trend toward con-
centration of market power in commercial banking is contrary to the
public interest in maintaining competition among existing commercial
banks.5 Since commercial banking had traditionally been considered
exempt from section 7 prosecution,6 the cry for legislative response
was immediate.
The 1966 amendment 7 to the Bank Merger Act of 1960 reflects the
congressional reaction. The amendment attempts to reconcile the
judicial application of section 7 with the standards applied by the fed-
eral banking agencies in evaluating merger applications under the 1960
act. It is anticipated that this reconciliation will develop from the
1. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
2. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). The pertinent portion
states: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of
the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
3. 374 U.S. at 349.
4. Id. at 363.
5. The Court declared: "We noted in Brown Shoe Co. (citation omitted), that
'[t]he dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 amendments
[to § 7] was a fear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic concentra-
tion in the American economy.' This intense congressional concern with the trend
toward concentration warrants dispensing, in certain cases, with elaborate proof of
market structure, market behavior, or probable anticompetitive effects. Specifically,
we think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share
of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of
firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it
must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not
likely to have such anticompetitive effects." 374 U.S. at 362-63.
6. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Regulation of Bank Mergers, S. REP.
No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959); Regulation of Bank Mergers, H.R. REP. No.
1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1960); KAYsmE & TURNER, ANTIRrUST PouacY 42 (1959).
7. Pub. L. No. 89-356, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 21, 1966) (will be 12 U.S.C. §
1823(c)).
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establishment of a single set of standards against which future
merger applications may be measured. These standards are applicable
to "the banking supervisory agencies, the Department of Justice, and
the courts under the antitrust laws."8 This note, by combining legal
analysis of the amendment with pertinent economic considerations,
will attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the legislation and expose
those areas which require more intensive congressional consideration.
II. ECONOMIC PERSPECrIVE: REGULATION, COMPETITION AND
CONCENTRATION IN COMMERCIAL BANKING
A. Regulation of Commercial Banking9
While generally the occasional failure of business concerns is not
considered undesirable in light of the overall benefits to be derived
from unrestricted competition, 0 the central role of banking in the
national economy has fostered widespread recognition that bank
solvency and liquidity are sufficiently important to require a check
on competitive forces." Therefore, public regulation of commercial
banking reflects an attempt to obtain the benefits of competition while
guarding against widespread bank failure as a method of eliminating
the less efficient competitors from the market structure. As a result
the regulatory scheme is characterized by the somewhat conflicting
objectives of efficiency through competition and stability through
regulation.
The most fundamental regulation imposed upon the market struc-
ture of commercial banking is limitation of entry. A charter for a
new national bank will not be granted unless the capital structure,
earnings prospects and management capabilities of the prospective
bank give adequate assurance that entry will not produce excessive
competition and possible failure. 2 Similarly, inability to meet these
8. House Committee on Banking and Currency, Bank Merger Act Amendment, H.R.
REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966); Pub. L. No. 89-356, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (Feb. 21, 1966) (will be 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(7)(B)).
9. Commercial banking is subject to comprehensive regulation under state and
federal law. Congress has created three agencies which share supervisory responsibility
at the federal level. They are the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. For
an outline of federal-state supervisory responsibility and the division of responsibility
among the federal agencies see Suncomm. ON DOMEsTIc FINANCE, HOUSE COMm. ON
BANKING Am CURRENCY, 88TH CONG., lST SESS., CoMPARATIVE REGULATIONS OF
FINANCrAL INSTITUTIONS 57 (Subcomm. Print 1963) [hereinafter cited as COMPARAVE
REGULATIONS]. Congress is studying the feasibility of reorganizing and consolidating
the tripartite agency structure. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 89TH
CONG., 1sT SEss., REORGANIZATION OF FEDERAL BANx SUPERVISION (Subcomm. Print
1965).
10. Berle, Banking Under the Anti-Trust Laws, 49 COLum. L. REV. 589, 592 (1949).
11. "A bank failure is a community disaster. Ibid.
12. REV. STAT. § 5169 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 27 (1958) (national banks);
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standards may cause the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), in effect, to prevent entry by denying an application for
deposit insurance. 13 The FDIC, Federal Reserve Board (FRB), and
the Comptroller of the Currency may refuse permission to open new
branches on the same grounds.' 4 Furthermore, national banks are
apparently subject to state law with regard to branching limitations.15
Banks are also subject to numerous provisions designed to insure
sound banking practices. For example, banks belonging to the
Federal Reserve System (member banks) and insured non-member
banks are precluded from paying interest on demand deposits.16 This
discourages competitive efforts to attract demand deposits and the
correlative tendency to make speculative loans and investments to
cover the interest costs. Federal law also requires the FRB and
FDIC to specify maximum rates of interest that insured banks may
pay on savings and time deposits. 17 A number of states also limit the
rate of interest payable,18 and, where the state rate is below the federal
maximum, federal law requires that national banks not exceed the
state maximum rate.19
Regulation of competition also extends to the market for bank
loans. The area within which competitive forces operate is circum-
scribed as to maximum rates by state usury laws,20 and is affected as
to the minimum charge by FRB manipulation of the rediscount rate,
open-market operations and modification of reserve requirements.
2'
'While the FRB operations are not regulatory in the strict sense, they
affect the supply of money and credit in the economy and thereby
influence the "prnie" or minimum bank interest rate. In the range
between the practical minimum set by Federal Reserve policy and
see COmPARATIWV REEULATIONS 60-61; U.S. ATr'y GEN. Comm. ON ADMINIST1A'rIVE
PROCEDuRE, FEDERAL CONThOL OF BANKING 21-22 (1940). Entry of state banks is
generally governed under similar requirements or broad discretionary power given to
the approving board or official.
13. 64 Stat. 873 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1815 (1957), grants power to deny. The
grounds are specified in 64 Stat. 873 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1957).
14. 64 Stat. 873 (1950), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(d)(1957); 38 Stat. 259 (1913), as
amended, 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1965); REv. STAT. § 5155 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C.
§ 36 (1965).
15. REV. STAT. § 5155 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1965).
16. 48 Stat. 181 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1945); 64 Stat. 873
(1950), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(g) (1965).
17. 48 Stat. 182 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 371(b) (1965); 64 Stat. 873
(1950), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(g) (1965).
18. CoMPARATIvE REGULATIONS 13-15.
19. Id. at 13.
20. 1Ev. STAT. § 5197 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1945). In the absence
of state law a federal limit is applicable.
21. ALnADEFF, MONOPOLY AND COMPETTON IN BANKING 150 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as AL.ADEF]; AMEUCAN BANKERs Ass'N, TkE COMMERCIAL BANKING INDUSTRY
86-96 (1962) (monograph prepared for the Commission on Money and Credit).
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the maximum allowed under state usury laws, competitive forces are
free to operate. Moreover, national banks are precluded from lending
more than an amount equal to ten per cent of their paid-in capital
and unimpaired surplus to any one obligor,22 and state banks are
generally subject to similar limitations.23 National and state member
banks are also prohibited from investing in common stocks, and from
holding for their own account investment securities of a single
obligor in excess of ten per cent of the bank's unimpaired capital
and surplus.24 Such investment prohibitions, while helping to insure
continued stability, have the added effect of limiting the control
which banks might otherwise exert over industry in general. In
addition, the broad visitorial powers of federal bank examiners provide
the agencies with a flow of information based on frequent and
intensive examinations. The banks must furnish detailed periodic
reports of their operations, and the agencies have the power to order
examinations whenever they are deemed necessary.2 Numerous sanc-
tions are provided, 27 but the vast majority of banks go to great lengths
to avoid grounds for criticism.
The foregoing restrictions on private initiative have caused econo-
mists to question the extent to which antitrust policy can foster a
type of competition conducive to improved bank performance. 28 Those
questioning the appropriateness of antitrust enforcement argue that
under current public policy, banking is essentially a regulated industry,
with basic decisions such as entry, expansion, competition for loanable
funds and pricing all controlled to some degree.29 As a result, the
private decision-making process, through which competitive forces
22. REv. STAT. § 5200 (1906), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1965).
23. COmPARATIVE REGULATIONS 29.
24. REv. STAT. § 5136 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1965); 48 Stat. 165
(1933), 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1945).
25. REv. STAT. § 5211 (1877), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 161 (1965); 38 Stat. 259
(1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 324 (1965); 64 Stat. 873 (1950), 12 U.S.C. §
1820(b) (1957).
26. "National banks are required to be examined at least three times every two
years by examiners appointed by the Comptroller of the Currency. The policy of the
Federal Reserve Banks and Board is to examine each state member bank once a year,
and the" Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has the same policy for insured banks
not members of the Federal Reserve System." COMPARATrVE REGULATONS 59; REv.
STAT. § 5240 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1965); 40 Stat. 232 (1913), as
amended, 12 U.S.C. § 325 (1945); REV. STAT. § 5240 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C.
§ 483 (1945); 64 Stat. 873 (1950), 12 U.S.C. 1820(b), (g) (1957).
27. U.S. ATT'Y GEN. COMr. ON ADmINIsTvarvE PRocEDRnE, op. cit. supra note 12,
at 17.
28. Phillips, Competition, Confusion and Commercial Banking, 19 J. FINANCE 32
(1964); cf., Abramson, Private Competition and Public Regulation, 1 NAT'L BANXINc
REV. 101 (1963).
29. Phillips, supra note 28, at 39; Carson & Cootner, The Structure of Competition
in Commercial Banking in the United States, in PrrATE FiNANcsL INSTTUTONS 55,
131 (1963) (monograph prepared for the Commission of Money and Credit).
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find expression, is restrained. Therefore, given the existing complex
of public regulation and the character of the industry,30 it is con-
sidered impossible to achieve, through conventional antitrust policy,
a competitive system which will significantly improve performance. 31
Diametrically opposed to this view is the position taken by the
Supreme Court in the Philadelphia case. There, while recognizing
the extent of banking regulation, 32 the Court implicitly indicated
that where market entry is controlled the public is in greater need
of viable competition among existing firms than where added protec-
tion is provided by free entry.3 This conflict will have continued
importance in future cases, since it appears certain that the Antitrust
Division will urge the application of section 7 to bank mergers in
spite of the purpose of the 1966 amendment.
34
B. Line of Commerce: Commercial Banking or Financial Institutions
A critical problem in section 7 cases is the determination of the
relevant "product market" or "line of commerce." Since this concept
serves as a competitive frame of reference within which the competi-
tive effects of a merger will be evaluated, the breadth of the definition
becomes important. Current decisional law aside, "line of commerce'
is best understood as groups of products or services in competition
with one another, and therefore, to some extent, interchangeable from
the consumer's standpoint.35 Thus, a line of commerce definition
including a great many alternatives will likely lead to the conclusion
that a proposed merger does not substantially lessen competition.
On the other hand, a line of commerce containing only a few alter-
natives is more likely to result in a conclusion that merger lessens
30. Commenting on the effect of the public regulatory structure and private inter-
organizational arrangements such as correspondent banking and clearinghouse associa-
tions, Phillips concludes that . . . "public regulation and private organization [have]
the necessary effect of producing ostensibly non-competitive results." Phillips, supra
note 28, at 39.
31. "For the entire economy, more banks do not mean a larger total supply in the
same sense as is the case in other industries .... Rather, if the number of banks
increases and the supply of credit is fixed, the size of the average bank decreases, and,
assuming the existence of economies of scale, the system moves away from the most
efficient allocation of resources." Phillips, supra note 28, at 41.
32. 374 U.S. at 324-35.
33. "There is no reason to think that concentration is less inimical to the free play
of competition in banking than in other service industries. On the contrary, it is in all
probability more inimical." Id. at 369. "The fact that banking is a highly regulated
industry... makes the play of competition not less important but more so." Id. at 372.
34. See Shapiro & Kareken, Lines of Commerce, Standards of Illegality, and Section
7 Predictability, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rtv. 628 (1965).
35. "[A] meaningful line of commerce would be an output type which is sufflciently
differentiated from other outputs in the minds of buyers to make other products appear
distinctly inferior substitutes." Herman, The Philadelphia Bank Merger Decision and
its Critics, 1 NAT'L BANKING REv. 391, 392 (1964).
[ VOL. 20
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competition. The distinction between narrow and broad definitions
is particularly relevant in the context of bank mergers, since com-
mercial banks provide a greater variety of products (credit) and
services than any other single financial institution. This is not to say,
however, that many financial institutions do not offer comparable
products and services which are able to compete vigorously with those
offered by commercial banks.
In Philadelphia the Supreme Court found that the appropriate line
of commerce was "the cluster of products (various kinds of credit)
and services (such as checking accounts and trust administration),
denoted by the term 'commercial banking. . . ."'I This is a narrow
definition in that no other single "producer" of financial services offers
the variety available to the commercial bank customer.37 It is impor-
tant to note, however, that the Supreme Court did not foreclose
completely the possibility of considering financial institutions generally
as the appropriate line of commerce. 8 As a result, the line of com-
merce definition could be broadened to include the services of other
financial institutions, and, in the event other institutions provide the
requisite competition in the services examined, the chances of up-
holding a proposed merger would be enhanced. Thus it may prove
valuable to consider the relation between the services of commer6ial
banks and the services of other financial institutions.
Commercial banks are in a dominant competitive position with
regard to demand deposit (checking) accounts.39 They are the only
financial institutions which may accept demand deposits, the primary
36. 374 U.S. at 356.
37. "The principal banking 'products' are . . .various types of credit, for example:
unsecured personal and business loans, mortgage loans, loans secured by securities or
accounts receivable, automobile installment and consumer goods installment loans,
tuition financing, bank credit cards, revolving credit funds. Banking services include:
acceptance of demand deposits from individuals, corporations, governmental agencies,
and other banks; acceptance of time and savings deposits; estate and trust planning
and trusteeship services; lock boxes and safety-deposit boxes; account reconcilation
services; foreign department services (acceptances and letters of credit); correspondent
services; investment advice." Id. at 326-27 n.5.
38. The Court recognized a number of financial institutions as "more or less in
competition with commercial banks .. " Id. at 327 n.5, and later indicated there was
no evidence in the record to rebut the inherently anticompetitive tendency of the
merger. The latter statement indicates implicitly that the Court would acknowledge
proof of competition from other financial institutions.
39. Herman, supra note 35, at 393-94. Whereas other lending institutions rely
heavily on bank credit for loanable funds, the demand deposit-fractional reserve tech-
nique allows commercial banks, in effect, to create credit. Thus Bank A may receive
a deposit of $100.00, and if it is required to keep a 20% cash reserve it can make, an
$80.00 loan to a new customer. Assuming that this customer were to deposit the entire
$80.00 in his checking account, the bank could lend up to $64.00, or 80%, keeping
$16.00 on band to meet the reserve requirement of 20%.
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function of which is to serve as a means of payment.4" This is a
distinct-advantage since available substitutes, such as cash, postal
money orders and registered checks, do not offer comparable alter-
natives based on convenience or cost per check.
Several writers have criticised the Supreme Court's unwillingness
to consider the competitive position of alternative sources of short-
term business credit.41 Suggested alternative sources are the com-
mercial paper market, finance companies, and trade credit. Since
finance companies rely heavily upon banks for their supply of funds
their cost factor is necessarily higher than a bank's. Therefore, their
interest rates are higher, diminishing their competitive effectiveness. 42
The commercial paper market has apparently been overestimated as
a source of competition for commercial banks,43 and while there is
some difference of opinion44 it would appear that trade credit is
not a substitute for bank credit since trade credit will normally be
exhausted prior to seeking bank funds.45  Insurance companies are
generally regarded as increasingly active competitors for long-term
business and government loans, and there is some authority to the
effect that commercial banking's share of the consumer credit and
mortgage lending markets has decreased in recent years.47 The
40. AmUnicA_ BANtRms Ass'N, ThE CoMvMacIA BANKING INDUSTRY 63-66 (1963)
(monograph prepared for the Commission on Money and Credit). Occasionally de-
mand deposit accounts are mentioned as a facility for the storage of wealth. As a
corollary of the demand deposit function this may be the case, but normally the avail-
ability of desirable income producing alternatives is sufficient to discourage maintenance
of unnecessarily high demand account balances.
41. Motter, Bank Mergers and Public Policy, 1 NAT'L BANKING REv. 89, 94 (1903);
Shull, Commercial Banking as a "Line of Commerce," 1 NAT'L BANKING REv. 187, 202
(1963).
42. Recognizing that price differences result partly from differences in risk assumed
by finance companies, Alhadeff writes: "In part, the price differences are a reflection of
cost differences. When finance companies are heavily dependent upon banks for their
loanable funds, the cost of funds to the finance company is likely to be higher than
for a bank. The banks must cover their costs and seek to make a profit on finance
company loans. Thus, the cost of finance company funds must start from a base which
already includes the full cost of funds to the bank. Partly, the price differences are
owing to the fact that banks can get greater leverage on their equity capital than
finance companies. For an individual bank, the important source of loanable funds is
not equity capital but demand and time deposits. . . . The greater leverage in banks
.. . means that the same rate of interest on loans by both lenders would . . . yield a
higher net rate of return on capital to banks than to finance companies." ALILADEFF 18.
43. Herman, supra note 35, at 395-96, indicating that even though total borrowings
in the commercial paper market have increased, apparently the number of borrowers
has decreased thereby lessening the competitive force with regard to banking.
. 44. Id. at 394. Herman concludes that trade credit is an inferior alternative due to
higher cost. Carson & Horvitz, Concentration Ratios and Competition, 1 NAT'L BANKING
REV. 105, 109 (1963), reflects the position that trade credit is extremely important to
small business borrowers.
45. Aumnzrr 14-15, 19.
46. ComAnATmrE REGULATIONS 293-95.
47. BocEN, TnE COMPETrVE POSITION OF COMMERCIAL BANKS 23, 27 (1959).
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Supreme Court recognized the possibility of competition between
banks and savings institutions in "terms of cost and price." The
Court added, however, that banks "enjoy a settled consumer prefer-
ence, insulating them, to a marked degree, from competition ....- 48
Economic analysis indicates that this conclusion is questionable as a
general proposition,49 though apparently accurate in context.
Future merger cases, whether under paragraph 5(B) of the 1966
amendment 0 or section 7, will involve a line of commerce determina-
tion. Whether the services of financial institutions other than com-
mercial banks will be considered in evaluating a proposed merger
is an open question, particularly in view of the wording of the
amendment and its legislative history.51 Commercial banking is cer-
tainly a unique industry. The combined effect of the demand
deposit function, business lending dominance, and the convenience
of extensive financial services in one location are not to be denied.
However, by characterizing commercial banking as the line of com-
merce, it appears that the Court has placed excessive reliance upon
uniqueness, thereby indicating the need for more detailed analysis of
whether, and to what extent, other financial institutions compete
with commercial banks.52 Indeed, this question deserves thoughtful
congressional consideration if the larger issues presented by the bank
merger problem are to be resolved.
C. Concentration and Its Anti-Competitive Effect
Concentration ratios reflect the size-distribution of firms in a
particular industry.P Since degrees of concentration are usually
48. 374 U.S. at 357.
49. Alhadeff & Alhadeff, The Struggle for Commercial Bank Savings, 72 Q.J. EcoN.
1 (1958), provides a comprehensive analysis of the reasons for the decline in com-
mercial bank savings in relation to the growth of savings and loan associations (SLA).
See CO mpA ATIVE REGULAt ONS 103 for a table of asset growth. It is interesting to
note that SLA assets increased approximately 77 billion dollars during the period
1050-1962. This represents an increase of almost 600%. See S. REP. No. 196, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1959), for a compilation reflecting the growth of credit unions,
life insurance companies, and SLA's.
50. Phillips, supra note 28, at 32-33.
51. See notes 64 & 146 infra. See also Note, The 1966 Amendment to the Bank
Merger Act, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 764, 779-81 (1966).
52. Analysis of the competitive influence of other financial institutions should in-
clude: mutual savings banks, SLA's, credit unions, casualty and property insurance
companies, investment banks, investment companies, life insurance companies, sales
finance companies and business finance companies.
53. "Concentration' is utilized in economic and legal analysis in two ways. General
concentration is the measure of the share of economic activity accounted for by the
largest firms in the total economy, or a broad segment thereof. The second type of
concentration measures the share of an industry or product that is accounted for by
the largest firms in the industry or the largest firms producing the product. The latter
measure is used in this discussion. MASON, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION -AND THE
MONOPOLY PROBL M 16-17 (1957).
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expressed in terms of a firm's percentage share of the total business
conducted, an industry or line of commerce is characterized as
highly concentrated when a few firms control a significant share of
the existing business. While there is general agreement that con-
centration and competition are related,5 the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in Philadelphia leaves ground for comment. The Court's
reliance upon the proposition that competition is greatest where
there are many sellers, none having a significant market share,5
discloses an oversimplified conception of the effects of bank mergers,
and perhaps of mergers in general. Implicit in this reasoning is the
view that the degree of competition is a function of the number of
competitors in the market.56 To draw any meaningful conclusions
regarding the 1966 amendment, and the bank merger problem gen-
erally, a closer examination of the impact of concentration on com-
mercial banking is essential.
Banking concentration is measured in several ways, but the method
most often employed is to measure the percentage of assets, loans or
deposits held by the largest banks in the market sampled. Levels of
concentration and their fluctuations, when viewed as isolated statistics,
may not accurately reflect the degree of competition among existing
firms.5 7 For example, a one-bank town has a concentration level of
100 per cent but the local bank may compete vigorously with
several banks in adjacent communities. Similarly, in a city where three
banks are dominant, an increase in concentration may result from
aggressive competition on the part of these banks to attract new
industry to the area, while a decrease in concentration may reflect a
decline in local business. It also appears doubtful that the merger
54. Id. at 32; KAYsEN & TuHNER, AN=TTUST POLICY 14 (1959).
55. 374 U.S. at 363.
56. Performance does not necessarily increase as the number of banks increases.
Phillips, referring to a study by the Bank Markets Unit, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve Board, stated that "there was a slight but significant tendency for
the rates charged by individual banks to decrease as the share of the market possessed
by the bank increased. The number of banks in the markets, the size of the largest
banks and the proportion of the market accounted for by the three largest banks all
possessed no explanatory value .... " Phillips, supra note 28, at 37. Referring to the
type of structural hypothesis applied by the Court, another writer stated, "[t]hre
are serious problems connected with the use of this yardstick. First, not every firm
contributes equally to competition. In particular, there may be a fringe of firms too
small to be able to affect price and production policies in the market as a whole.
Alternatively, certain firms may be marginal in the sense that their costs and financial
situations preclude them from having much, if any, impact on market conditions; in-
deed they may be able to remain in operation only because excessive profits are being
earned by the stronger firms., An influx of companies of this sort would have much
less significance than a counting of corporate heads would imply." Bok, Section 7 of
the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HArv. L. REv. 226, 312
n.261 (1960). See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), 19 VAND.




of banks providing complementary, rather than competitive, services,
would necessarily result in a lessening of competition, even though
the level of concentration would be increased. Unquestioned reliance
upon concentration ratios as a measure of competition is also dis-
credited by the existence of "economies of scale." While these
economies may benefit the customer through lower costs, 58 they may
also raise questions as to anti-competitive effects since they result
from increases in size which allow more efficient internal organization
and greater dispersion of risk. Realizing, therefore, that concentration
itself does not necessarily cause a true lessening of competition, a
brief examination of the effects of concentration on borrowers will
be helpful.
Price competition among commercial banks is generally centered
in the market for customer loans. Analysis of credit markets indicates
that the geographic area within which banks compete for loans is
segmented according to the credit requirements of the borrower.59
Large borrowers participate in the national or wholesale credit
market, and, since there are many alternative suppliers available, it
is highly unlikely that merger would have an adverse effect upon
large-borrower interest rates.60 The situation confronting the small-
and intermediate-size borrower, however, is less encouraging. The
intermediate-size borrower generally seeks credit in a regional market,
and merger would, therefore, decrease the number of alternative
suppliers. 61 Similarly, the withdrawal by merger of an alternative
source may adversely affect the small borrower, particularly in view
of the personal nature of his credit standing and the difficulties
flowing therefrom.62 With credit markets segmented in terms of
borrower-size, it is also possible that a merger will create a bank which
is highly competitive in one borrower-market while assuming the
position of an oligopolist or monopolist in another. The Supreme
Court refused to weigh these anti-competitive effects against beneficial
effects in Philadelphias but the 1966 amendment apparently requires
58. GnAMLEY, SCALE EcoNoMiEs IN BANXmIN 59 (1962) (Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City).
59. ALHADEFF 40-46. See United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240
F. Supp. 867, 901, 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), in which the court recognized the metropolitan
area of New York City as the relevant market for "retail" banking, and the entire
United States as the geographic market for "wholesale" banking. .
60. AmiADEFF 41. Phillips apparently disagrees with this analysis but does not offer
data to support his conclusion. Phillips, supra note 28, at 38.
61. ALADiDEFF 41-44.
62. Id. at 45. To a great extent the small borrower maintains a continuing relation-
ship with "his" bank. Therefore there is probably very little "shopping" for credit, so
that the very nature of the relationship may curtail price competition. Phillips, supra
note 28, at 37.
63. "We are clear, however, that a merger the effect of which 'may be substantially
to lessen competition' is not saved because, on some ultimate re&oning of social or
economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial." 374 U.S. at 371.
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the courts to apply such a balancing test4 in the future.
It is evident that analysis of bank mergers is an exceedingly difficult
task. Relatively little is known about such critical factors as the
competitive role, if any, of other financial institutions, the impact of
concentration on price and performance, and the extent to which the
current regulatory structure fosters effective competition. This
ignorance stems, in part, from the fact that the antitrust history of
bank mergers began just seven years ago.65 Obviously, there are
pitfalls in reliance on concentration ratios, although there is authority
to the effect that "[m]arket concentration . . . [is] . . . significantly
associated with the pricing, output, and profits of banks-high con-
centration being associated with high loan rates, low rates on time
and savings deposits, and high profits." 6 Furthermore, even though
analysis of the segmented borrower-market indicates that the small-
and intermediate-size borrowers may be adversely affected by merger,
there is also authority indicating that bank interest rates tend to
remain stable after merger.6 Even in a monopolistic situation it is
unlikely that a bank would charge unreasonably high interest rates,
due to fear of entry and out-of-town competition.6 This fundamental
difference of opinion illustrates that anti-competitive effects cannot be
evaluated realistically when they are regarded as proportionate to the
number of competitors in the market.6
At this point in the evolution of the commercial banking industry
there are many questions and relatively few readily available answers.
Prior to Philadelphia the situation was less troublesome-banking was
thought to be exempt from antitrust prosecution. In a sweeping
reaction to the market structure developed during the period of
exemption, the Supreme Court applied the antitrust laws to com-
mercial bank mergers. In Philadelphia, as in subsequent merger
64. "[T]he bill acknowledges that the general principle of the antitrust laws-that
substantially anticompetitive mergers are prohibited-applies to banks, but permits an
exception in cases where it is clearly shown that a given merger is so beneficial to the
convenience and needs of the community to be served . . . that it would be in the
public interest to permit it." (Emphasis added.) House Committee on Banking and
Currency, Bank Merger Act Amendment, H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
3-4 (1966).
65. United States v. Firstamerica Corp., Civil No. 38139, N.D. Cal., filed March 30,
1959. The case was settled by consent decree.
66. Edwards, The Banking Competition Controversy, 3 NAT'L BANKING REV. 1, 25
(1965).
67. LENT, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE oF CoMMEncIAL BANKING 16 (1960).
68. ALrAD=FF 223. Conversely, an increase in the number of banks in a small town
would not lower rates to the small borrower. The new entrant would merely share in
the existing business and each bank would be driven to a higher point on its cost
curve and would therefore have to charge higher rates to maintain earnings at previous
levels. ALHAAEFF 219.
69. See note 56 supra.
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cases,70 the Court has relied upon Congress' intent "to preserve com-
petition among many small businesses by arresting a trend toward
concentration in its incipiency."
If antitrust prosecution is to be meaningful, it would appear that
its force must be applied to a market structure within which com-
petition can be preserved. It has been suggested that the current
regulatory complex surrounding commercial banking actually renders
antitrust enforcement meaningless.7' This conclusion, it is urged,
follows from the fact that public regulation and private inter-bank
cooperation tend to produce noncompetitive results, as evidenced by
(1) the low bank failure rate, 2 (2) the continued existence of firms
of less than the optimal scale, and (3) the lack of strong price
competition. 3 Thus the fundamental questions are raised-whether,
and to what extent, banks should be subject to the antitrust laws.
The Supreme Court has already replied, but Congress, through the
1966 amendment to the Bank Merger Act, has chosen to leave its
answer unclear.74
70. E.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
71. Phillips, supra note 28, at 32-33.
72. See Hearings on S. 1698 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings] (table 18 indicating the bank suspension rate has remained at a very low
level since 1943).
73. "The apparent lack of strong price competition, the continued existence of many
banks of less than optimal scale and the insensitivity of market performance to market
structure are not difficult to explain. They arise because of a vastly complex system
of public regulation and supervision working in conjunction with a well-developed, yet
generally informal, private market organization. Most of the public regulation appears
in the guise of instruments designed to protect the safety of banks and the liquidity
of the payments mechanism-that is, to prevent bank failures and banking practices
which might lead to failures. Much, but not all, of the private rationalization of
competition is a side effect of certain cooperative arrangements among bankers-clearing
houses, loan participations, and correspondent relations, for example-which add to the
efficiency of the system. The point is not that there are conscious efforts to arrange
conspiracies in restraint of trade, but rather that public regulation .has the express
purpose and private organization has the necessary effect of producing essentially non-
competitive results .. . . The most important single policy would be to permit freer
entry.. . . The elimination of restrictions on interest rates paid on deposits would be
another important step." Phillips, supra note 28, at 38-39, 44. See Shull & Horvitz,
Branch Banking and the Structure of Competition, 1 NAT'L BANKING Rnv. 301, 340-
41 (1963), for an analysis suggesting that current branching controls are too stringent.
74. Apparently the banking industry, at this point, is unwilling to encourage Con-
gress to consider the underlying issues. Witness the efforts of the interested banks
to discredit the unfavorable report of an American Bar Association task group ap-
pointed to study the original bill. See REPoRT OF SPECIAL SUECOMNM=IEE OF TH
CLAYTON ACT SuBcommnTrEE OF TBE ANTRUST SECTION OF TH AMEucAN BAn
AssoCIAno ON S. 1698:
The subcommittee is opposed to the enactment of S. 1698 for the reason that it
considers the bill to constitute an attempt to deal with only a small part of a much
larger problem. The subcommittee does not believe that the Congress has addressed
itself to the basic question of whether and to what extent the antitrust laws should
apply to banking.
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III. PBE-AmENDMENT BANK MERGER REGULATION
A. Historical Background
1. Pre-1950: Antitrust Exemption for Banks.-Prior to 1950, bank
mergers were exempt from section 7 of the Clayton Act.75 In that
year, the Celler-Kefauver Amendment to section 7 76 was enacted to
reach undue concentration of economic power in its incipiency"1 by
increasing the strictness of anti-competitive merger standards and
extending the statute's scope to include stock as well as asset acquisi-
tions by any "corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission." Bank mergers remained immune from coverage
since banks had never been subject to Commission jurisdiction and
Congress has not seen fit in many instances to grant immunity from the antitrust
laws, and has done so only where the nature of the industry involved is such that
competition would not be in the public interest. In those cases where Congress has
seen fit to grant exemptions from the antitrust laws, for example with respect to air-
lines, shipping and railroads, it has accompanied such exemptions with a comprehensive
system of regulation, more extensive in nature and of a different character than that
which presently exists in the banking field.
The subcommittee is of the view that it is inappropriate to deal with bank mergers
independently rather than as an integral part of the overall problem of whether and
to what extent regulation should replace competition in banking. It strongly recom-
mends that Congress make a study of the banking industry to determine whether or
not banking should be treated as being so infused with the public interest as to re-
quire pervasive regulation.
The subcommittee does wish, however, to state its conviction that uniformity in the
regulation of banking is desirable. For this reason, the subcommittee wishes to express
its belief that, in any event, a single Federal banking agency would be clearly prefer-
able to the present situation which involves three separate agencies.
Hearings on S. 1698 Before the Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the House
Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 996 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as House Hearings]. "The law firms representing the favored banks charged
several members of the Task Group with conflict of interest in light of their association
with firms having bank customers for clients or their previous employment in the
Antitrust Division. Pursuant to an organized campaign, letters were sent to the members
of the Section 7 Clayton Act Subcommittee attacking the Subcommittee for making
reports on matters concerning pending litigation and private litigates and challenging
the report on the basis of special or partisan interest." Note, supra note 51, at 776
n.91 (1966). See House Hearings 993-1022, 1769-1908.
75. Section 7 provides in part that no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the assets of another corporation and that no
corporation (whether or not subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC) shall acquire the
stock of another corporation if in either case the "effect . . . may be to substantially
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958). Since application of antitrust laws to banks is not within FTC
jurisdiction, 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1958); 38 Stat. 719
'(1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (6) (1958); 38 Stat. 721 (1914), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1958), bank mergers could not be governed by § 7 unless regarded
as stock acquisitions. See Wemple & Cutler, The Federal Bank Merger Law aid The
Antitrust Laws, 16 Bus. L.&w. 994, 999 (1061).
76. 64 Stat. 1125,(1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
77. S. REP. NO. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950).
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the term "stock acquisition" was believed to include only acquisitions
in the holding company sense.78
2. Post Celler-Kefauver Amendment Period.-In Transamerica Corp.
v. Board of Governors,9 a 1953 decision, the Third Circuit, relying
heavily upon the reasoning of United States v. South-Eastern Under-
writer Ass'n,80 held the Clayton Act applicable to banking. This
marked the first time that a court had considered the advancement of
credit as being equivalent to "commerce"81 and had thus brought
banking within the antitrust law. However, until 1960, bank mergers
could still be effected without federal approval, and where approval
was required, competitive effects were not evaluated by banking
agencies. No effective administrative control existed to compensate
for Sherman and Clayton Act weaknesses. Dissatisfaction with the
Celler-Kefauver Amendments failure to reach bank mergers was
frequently expressed in Congress,83 and the Justice Department re-
quested that Congress amend section 7 so as to cover bank mergers
specifically. At the same time, the banking agencies proposed that
they be delegated power to consider competitive effects in evaluating
merger applications.8 By 1959, Congress, expressing "concern for the
maintenance of vigorous competition in the banking system... [and
a need for] legislation for uniform and effective regulation of
mergers,"85 adopted the banking agencies' proposal.
78. See Berle, Banking Under The Anti-Trust Laws, 49 CoLum. L. R~v. 589, 591
(1949).
79. 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).
80. 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944). The court there held that the Sherman Act covered
interstate insurance writing because "Congress wanted to go to the utmost extent of its
Constitutional power ...
81. See, e.g., Nathan v. Louisiana, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 73, 81 -(1850); Berle, supra
note 78, at 590.
82. Act of Nov. 7, 1918, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 32 (1964), requires the Comp-
troller of the Currency to approve mergers between two or more national banks. Sections
3 and 4 of this act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 34a, 34b(1964), likewise provide for Comptroller
approval where a state bank merges into a national bank. Section 18(c) of the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1964), requires federal approval of
mergers involving insured and uninsured banks, or involving the merger of an insured
bank into an insured state bank if the capital and surplus of the resulting bank are
less than the aggregate of the capital and surplus of the participants. Since the capital
and surplus of resulting banks are usually equal to the capital and surplus of
constitutent institutions, FDIC approval is rarely required. None of the provisions of
the Federal Reserve Act specifically dealt with mergers, but generally Federal Reserve
Board approval must be obtained under Regulation H for maintenance of branches
by resulting banks.
83. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1959); H.R. REP. No.
1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1960).
84. See Funk, Antitrust Legislation Affecting Bank Mergers, 75 BANicrnG L.J. 369,
376-77 (1958).
85. S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1959).
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B. Bank Merger Act of 1960
1. Purpose and Provisions.-The 1960 Bank Merger Act8" was
passed to combat a trend toward increased banking concentration and
to reconcile policies of competition and stability in banking. 7 Re-
sponsibility for merger approval was delegated among three regulatory
agencies-the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board,
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.8 This division of
authority was to achieve evaluation of mergers "by the agency most
thoroughly familiar with the bank involved."89 The jurisdictional
agencies were directed to request reports concerning "competitive
factors involved" in proposed mergers from other banking agencies
and the Attorney General.90 Agency reports were designed to promote
uniformity; the Justice Department's report was directed toward
utilizing "the Justice Department's long years of experience in the
anti-trust field."91 Report requirements could be waived if immediate
action was necessary "to prevent the probable failure of one of the
banks."92
The 1960 act applied to all banks insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.93 Banking agencies were directed to evaluate:
(1) the financial history and condition of each of the banks involved; (2)
the adequacy of its capital structure; (3) its future earnings prospects; (4)
the general character of its management; (5) the convenience and needs
of the community to be served; (6) and whether or not its corporate
powers are consistent with the purposes of this chapter . . . [t]he appropriate
agency shall also take into consideration the effect of the transaction on
competition (including any tendency toward monopoly), and shall not
approve the transaction unless, after considering all of such factors, it finds
the transaction to be in the public interest.94
86. The Bank Merger Act of 1960 amended section 1828(c) of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1964).
87. S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1959).
88. H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1960). The regulatory agency to
approve mergers is the Comptroller of the Currency when the resulting bank is a national
bank; the Federal Reserve Board when the resulting bank is a state-chartered member
of the Federal Reserve System; and the FDIC when the resulting bank is a state non-
member of the Federal Reserve System.
89. H. R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1960).
90. 76 Stat. 953 (1962), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1964).
91. S. REP. No. -196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1959); H. R. REP. No. 1416, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1960).
92. 76 Stat. 953 (1962), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1964).
93. Approximately 95% of banks in the United States are insured, and these banks
hold 97% of the country's assets. See H. R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1960).
94. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1964). The finding of public interest was tenuous in
many merger cases. In approving an application .under the 1960 act, the Federal
Reserve-Board stated: "In the present case . . .(the banking factors do not) weigh for
or against approval, and there are, both favorable and unfavorable considerations under
LEGISLATION
The 1960 Bank Merger Act do6s not affect state requirements for
bank mergers
5
2. Applicability of the Antitrust Laws.-The 1960 act contains no
express exemption from antitrust laws, nor is there a clause providing
for continued antitrust law applicability despite agency merger ap-
proval. Construing this omission as a manifestation of congressional
intent to preserve previous antitrust power, the Attorney General
attacked agency-approved mergers under both the Sherman and
Clayton Acts.9 6 Clearly, Congress intended Sherman Act standards
to have continued applicability to bank mergers under the 1960 act.
97
It was believed that section 7 did not apply to ordinary bank mergers,
but that Sherman Act provisions did apply. 8 Section 7 standards were
too stringent when applied to the unique structure of banking enter-
prises; and they were inappropriate to evaluate dangers of excessive
competition among competing banks.99 Since Sherman Act standards
had been imposed infrequently against bank mergers, 100 possibility of
conflict with agency-approved transactions appeared unlikely.
Under the 1960 Bank Merger Act, a merger might have anti-com-
petitive effects and still promote "public interest'-the ultimate stan-
dard for evaluating bank mergers.' 0 ' Theoretically, the act sought to
establish a balancing process between competitive and banking factors.
In practice, regulatory agencies found this solution unworkable due
to extensive overlap between the competitive effects of merger and
the "convenience and needs of the community." 102  Although the
the competitive factor. Although the decision is a close one, the Board feels that, on
balance, permitting the merger ...would beneficially stimulate competition .... "
Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 49 FED. REsFRvE BULL. 14, 16 (1962). See also Com-
mercial & Savings Bank, 51 FED. REsERvE Bu.L. 821, 822 (1965); Union Trust Co.,
49 FED. REsERvE BuLL. 326, 328 (1963). The seven factor considerations specified in
the Bank Merger Act of 1960 were not drafted specifically for the act but were taken
from prior regulatory legislation. Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 6, 66 Stat. 633
(1952), 12 U.S.C. § 322 (1064); see H. R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1966).
95. H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1960).
96. See 6 ANrMUsT BuLL. 55-56, 57-59 (1961).
97. See H.R. RE-'. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1960).
98. S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 20 (1959); H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1960).
99. S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1959); Wemple & Cutler, supra note
75.
100. Due perhaps to the influence of United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
495 (1948), only one action under ,§ 1 of the Sherman Act was brought against bank
mergers during the period 1950 to 1960 and this case was settled by consent decree.
See United States v. Firstamerica Corp., supra note 65.
101. H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-12 (1960).
102. House Hearings 707 (1965). The Federal Reserve Board attempted to clarify
the categories by establishing three classifications: competitive effects, banking factors,
and convenience and need. Id- at -384-91. The banking factors were composed of
earnings, adequacy of capital, and adequacy of management while' conveniefde and.
need of the community involved considerations such as expanded .sexices" and in-
creased loan limits.
1966 ]
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competitive factor was not defined by the 1960 act, reference to
Clayton Act monopoly standards was intended. 0 3 However, the latter
was not to be considered completely definitive of the former since:
(1) increased competition in one market could cancel corresponding
loss in another; (2) mergers were not to be invalidated solely on
the basis of size;' 4 and (3) past merger history was irrelevant in
determining approval or rejection of proposed mergers. 105
3. Congressional Attempt at Uniform Bank Regulation Defeated
by the Judiciary.-The 1960 act intended that bank mergers be sub-
jected to uniform standards appropriate to the banking industry.106
"Competitive factor" reports were required "in the interest of uniform
standards." In order to achieve this uniformity, agency approval
should have been conclusive as to the legality of a proposed merger.0 7
In United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,108 section 7 of the Clayton
Act was expanded to include bank mergers, and substantive standards
different from banking agency standards were applied. Philadelphia
held, inter alia, that "convenience and needs of the community" and
other banking factors applied by regulatory agencies under the 1960
act would not be applied by the court in considering section 7
violations. The court stated:
[a] merger the effect of which "may be substantially to lessen competition"
is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic
debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial.... Congress determined
to preserve our traditionally competitive economy. It therefore proscribed
anticompetitive mergers, the benign and malignant alike .... 109
The Court reasoned further that:
Congress contemplated that the 1950 amendment would give § 7 a reach
which would bring the entire range of corporate amalgamations, from pure
stock acquisitions to pure assets acquisitions, within the scope of § 7. Thus,
the stock-acquisition and assets-acquisition, read together, reach mergers,
which fit neither category perfectly but lie somewbere between the two
103. See 106 CONG. REc. 7258 (1960) (statement by Congressman Cellar).
104. A definite prejudice against size per se survives in our antitrust law. See United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
105. See 106 CONG. REG. 9713 (1960).
106. H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1060); S. R P. No. 196, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959).
107. The House Report stated that the "bill vests the ultimate authority to pass
on mergers in the . . . bank supervisory agencies." H.R. R.r. No. 1416, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1960). This position appears irreconcilable with congressional reports that
the bill would not affect applicability of the Sherman Act to bank mergers. Id. at 9;
S. BEP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1959). See also 105 CONG. REc. 8076,
8129, 8143 (1959).
108. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa. 1962),
rev'd, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
109. Id. at 371.
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ends of the spectrum .... So construed, the specific exception for
acquiring corporations not subject to the FTC's jurisdiction excludes from
the coverage of § 7 only assets acquisitions by such corporations when not
accomplished by merger.110
Under the Philadelphia holding, approved bank mergers could be
attacked collaterally as violative of the Clayton Act."' In merger
proposals, banking agencies applied the seven "banking factors" in
the 1960 act, including, but not dominated by, anti-competitive
considerations. "All of these seven factors must be considered and
weighed together, and the merger should be approved only if, after
consideration of all of these factors, the net result is in favor of the
proposal."" 2 Congress stated that the competitive factor should not
receive greater emphasis than the other six banking factors.
113
Subsequent to Philadelphia, the Lexington case" 4 held that, where
merging banks are major competitors in a relevant market, the elimina-
tion of significant competition between them constitutes a violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act. In the only other case to be
decided under the 1960 act," 5 the intended merger was held to
violate both section 1 and section 7. As a result of these decisions,
2,200 banks which had merged subsequent to the Celler-Kefauver
110. Id. at 342. This decision and its rationale caused much uncertainty as to the
proper public policy for bank merger transactions. See, e.g., Note, 77 HARv. L. REV. 81,
159-63 (1963); Williams, Banking and the Antitrust Laws, 81 BANmNG L. J. 377 (1964).
111. The vulnerability of agency-approved merger to Clayton Act suits under the
1960 act was due, in part, to the restrictive judicial definition of product market as
commercial banking. In United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665
(1964), the Supreme Court reaffirmed commercial banking as the "line of commerce"
laid down in Philadelphia. Both cases measured the degree of concentration in com-
mercial banking by examining the respective percent of commercial bank assets, de-
posits and loans held by merging banks and, based on these figures, made an approx-
imation of the "commercial banking business" controlled. This test is consistent with
the Court's apparent belief that demand deposits are the important factor reflecting
uniqueness of the economic rule of banking services and products. Note 39 supra and
accompanying text.
112. 106 CONG. REC. 9710-13 (1960) (remarks of Senator Fulbright).
113. The Senate Committee made "crystal clear its intention that the various bank-
ing factors in a particular case may be held to outweigh the competitive factors, and
that the competitive factors, however favorable or unfavorable, are not, in and of
themselves, controlling of the decision." S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20, 24
(1959).
114. United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., supra note 111, at 671-72 (1964).
This holding was unexpected since it had been assunied that elimination of the-
acquired bank was merely one of several factors which determined whether a merger
substantially lessened competition. See United States v. Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 951-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
115. United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., supra note 114. The court
stated: "Thus, the Bank Merger Act [of 1960] would appear to sanction agency ap-
proval of a merger, even though it violated the antitrust laws, if, on a balance of all
the designated factors, the agency decided that, nevertheless, it was in the overall
public interest. A court, however, would be obliged to invalidate a -merger found to
violate the antitrust laws even though it served the public interest." Id: at 884. - '
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Amendment, in reliance upon agency approval, were subject to
divestiture. Congressional intent to provide special industiy standards
for determining the legality of bank mergers was judicially defeated.10
In antitrust proceedings against approved mergers, the Justice Depart-
ment proceeded as if the 1960 act did not exist; and courts referred
to administrative banking factors only as they reflected special indus-
try characteristics relevant to antitrust issues." 7 Supremacy of judicial
standards in evaluating competitive effects of mergers was predicted
by Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Philadelphia:
The result is, of course, that the Bank Merger Act is almost completely
nullified; its enactment turns out to have been an exorbitant waste of
congressional time and energy . . . the Attorney General's report to the
designated banking agency is no longer truly advisory, for if the agency's
decision is not satisfactory a § 7 suit may be commenced immediately.
The bank merger's legality will then be judged solely from its competitive
aspects, unencumbered by any considerations peculiar to banking .... The
only vestige of the Bank Merger Act which remains is that the banking
agencies will have an initial veto. 118
Evaluating mergers under broad regulatory standards where com-
petition is one of several factors and testing the same transaction
under antitrust laws solely or primarily on anti-competitive effects
will inevitably result in conflicting decisions as to legality of the
merger.
4. Principal Defects of the 1960 Act.-The 1960 act's major fault
was failure to grant regulatory agencies authority to apply antitrust
laws per se. This thwarted the congressional intent to premise bank
merger legality upon a balanced assessment of competitive and bank-
ing factors." 9 Strict administrative control of anticompetitive bank
mergers was not achieved. 20 Agency findings without antitrust con-
116. See note 112 supra.
117. The Philadelphia case held that the traditional "failing company" doctrine,
whereby a defendant can interpose as a defense the dangers to liquidity or solvency
facing the acquired company, might have "somewhat larger contours" as applied to
bank mergers. 374 U.S. at 372 n.46 (1963).
118. 374 U.S. at 384-85. Dissatisfaction with the Philadelphia and Lexington de-
cisions led to a proposal that transactions approved under the 1960 Bank Merger Act
be exempt from antitrust laws unless attacked by the Justice Department within 30
days of approval. S. REP. No. 299, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 61965 (1965).
119. See 106 CONG. REc. 7257-59 (1960): "This (Bank Merger Act of 1960) puts
the responsibility for acting on a proposed merger where it belongs-in the agency
charged with supervising and examining the bank which will result from the merger."
120. Between May 13, 1960, and May 12, 1965, the Federal Reserve Board approved
142 applications and denied 17; the Comptroller approved 450 and denied 12; and the
FDIC approved 193 and denied only 2. See Senate Hearings 16-17. These approvals
are unusual since the Justice Department had reported adverse competitive effects with
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siderations were ineffectual and harmful to judicial efficiency. Further-
more, they created a trap for banks merging in good faith reliance
upon agency approval. 121 Requesting "competitive factor reports"
from other agencies by the jurisdictional agency did not result in
application of uniform standards among banking agencies since some
were more lenient than others in merger approval.'l 2
The 1960 act was intended to immunize banks from direct anti-
trust law application.1l 3 Maximum competition was not regarded as
an absolute goal, but rather a benefit to be considered in evaluating
"public interest." Strengthening of weak or poorly managed banks
and enlarging service capabilities of acquiring banks were equally
relevant benefits. Preliminary responsibility for weighing these
benefits was vested in specialized administrative agencies rather than
delegated to general court competence. 124 The Philadelphia holding
undermined the 1960 act's provisions and philosophy. Subsequent to
Philadelphia, banking factors served as the basis for initial veto, but
approved mergers could be attacked under antitrust laws where the
sole criteria was competition. The balancing of competitive and
banking factors provided for under the 1960 act was judicially
superseded.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE 1966 AMENDMENT
A. Purpose
The 1966 amendment seems a clear response to the Philadelphia
Court's refusal to balance social and economic advantages against
respect to 470 of the applications. House Hearings 175. An early attempt to cope
with lack of uniformity was the "freeze agreement" which provided that banking
agencies would not approve mergers as to which the Attorney General had filed an
adverse opinion pending final decision of the Philadelphia case. House Hearings 211-12.
121. Cf., United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., supra note 114, at
885-86 where the court stated: "The obvious purpose of [the agency approval procedure
of the Bank Merger Act of 1960] was to ...enable customers, businessmen, and the
community to place confidence in the lawfulness and stability of approved mergers";
and that a construction of the Philadelphia case which permits agency approval to be
totally disregarded in a subsequent antitrust action "turn[s] the Bank Merger Act into
a trap so repugnant to fundamental fairness that it would make a mockery of a court
of equity."
122. Although Congress recognized that under pre-1960 law refusal by one agency
to approve merger application might result in conversion of the applicant to a status
which would bring it under the jurisdiction of a more lenient agency, it was assumed
that interagency "competitive factor reports" would reduce forum-shopping. See, e.g.,
S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, 23 (1959); H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 12-13 (1960). This assumption was incorrect. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Aug. 5,
1964, p. 10, col. 2.
123. KIAYsEN & TuRNE, ANTITRUST POLICY 42 (1959), includes commercial banking
in the category of industries exempt from antitrust laws.
124. 106 CONG. Rsc. 7188 (1960).
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competitive disadvantages of merger transactions. 25 The amendment's
purpose is to provide a single substantive standard for determining
bank merger validity to be applied both by banking agencies and
courts.'2 This standard includes antitrust and banking criteria, 27
and embodies the balanced-judgment approach of the 1960 act-i.e.,
the "reckoning of social and economic debits and credits" in merger
proposals. Mergers violative of section 2 of the Sherman Act may
not be approved under any circumstances.
B. Substantive Standards
The 1966 amendment differs from the 1960 act in emphasis rather
than substantive change. Banking factors utilized in the 1960 act
are present in the amendment, but the emphasis is upon balancing
the "convenience and needs" criteria against anti-competitive effects
(if any) of proposed mergers.'2 To effectuate this balancing process,
the amendment provides for consideration of: (1) the merging insti-
tutions' financial resources; (2) managerial resources; and (3) future
prospects of existing and proposed institutions.
125. "The bill before us will reinstate the manifest congressional design and intent
of the 1950 and 1960 Acts. It will strike the Philadelphia, Lexington, and New York
decisions and opinions from the books .... The legislative history . . . should convince
the courts that Congress does not intend that mergers in the banking field should be
measured solely by the antitrust considerations which are applied in other institutions
.... We do not want the court to say as it did in the Philadelphia case, that a merger
which may substantially lessen competition in one line of business in one section of
the country is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social debits and
credits it may be deemed beneficial. We do not want the court to apply a statute
which . . . proscribes 'anticompetitive mergers, the benign and the malignant alike."'
112 CONG. RFc. 2540-41 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966).
126. H.R. 12173, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) § 1(a): "(B) In any judicial proceed-
ing attacking a merger approved (by the appropriate banking agency) on the ground
that the merger transaction alone and of itself constituted a violation of any anti-trust
laws other than section 2 (of the Sherman Act), the standards applied by the court
shall be identical with those that the banking agencies are directed to apply . .. .
127. H.R. 12173, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) § 2(c): "(c) Any court having
pending before it on or after the date of the Act and litigation instituted under the
anti-trust laws by the Attorney General after June 16, 1963, shall apply the sub-
stantive rule of law (that the approving agencies are directed to apply under the
Amendment)."
128. The Bank Merger Act of 1960 listed seven co-equal banking and competitive
factors. The amendment makes the administrative standards of the 1960 act applicable
to judicial antitrust proceedings. "The bill reaffirms, by establishing a clear set of
standards, what the Congress sought to do six years ago. These standards are not
essentially different from the criteria set up in the Bank Merger Act of 1960. Under
the latter act, the banking agencies must weigh the competitive impact in relation to
six banking factors in arriving at an ultimate decision to approve or reject a merger
application. The banking agencies, however, were to have the final say in a merger
case. H.R. 12173 establishes basically the same ground rules, but it more precisely
states the conditions under which the banking agencies may approve a merger that is
opposed by the Department of Justice. Furthermore, the bill gives the courts clear
guidelines for weighing banking factors against competitive factors." 112 CoNe. Ruc.
2335 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1966) (remarks of Congressman Widnall).
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Mergers consummated prior to the Philadelphia decision are granted
antitrust immunity regardless of whether or not they are involved in
pending litigation.12 9 Mergers consummated subsequent to Philadel-
phia, and subject to pending litigation, are judged by standards
applied to future mergers.130 Notice of proposed mergers must be
published in those communities where merging banks maintain offices
in order to provide residents an opportunity to express their views, 131
and "competitive factor" reports must be obtained from other banking
agencies and from the Attorney General.13 Agency approval is still
required for future mergers, and those violating section 2 of the
Sherman Act must be disapproved. 33 Substantially anti-competitive
mergers are prohibited, but an exception is made vWhere it clearly
appears that a proposed combination is so beneficial to the com-
munity's convenience and needs that public interest would be better
served through merger.
Subsequent to the earliest date on which approved mergers may
be consummated (usually thirty days after agency approval), the
merger may not be judicially attacked as violating antitrust laws
per se, unless there is a section 2 violation of the Sherman Act.134
129. H.R. REP. No. 299, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1965); 112 CONG. REc. 2538
(daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966); 'Pub. L. No. 356, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 21, 1966).
Mergers consummated before Philadelphia are "conclusively presumed" not to constitute
antitrust violations; a post-Philadelphia merger cannot "alone and of itself" constitute
violation. This phraseology may eliminate use of prior merger history in bank merger
cases. Clearly, in non-bank merger antitrust suits past acquisitions may be used to
show the intent of the acquiring company. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,
334 U.S. 495, 532 (1948). By exempting mergers consummated prior to Philadelphia,
§ 2(a) of the 1966 amendment to the Bank Merger Act immunized several previously
invalidated mergers. See Comment, 15 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 69, 90 (1966).
130. See H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1966). Since bank mergers
effected prior to Philadelphia occurred when banks had reasonable grounds to rely
upon agency approval, Congress felt that these banks had acted in "good faith" and
should not be forced to suffer divestiture. The issue of "good faith" reliance by banks
prior to Philadelphia is debatable. See House Hearings 38, 173, 195, 960-61.
131. House Hearings 161-63.
132. Banks desiring to merge must file a detailed application form containing such
information as the bank's financial and management situation, the reasons for merging,
the new services which will be offered, and considerations relevant to competition.
Informal negotiations are utilized to settle merger issues, rather than formal hearings.
See 1 DAvis, ADnimSTRATIV LAW § 4.04 (1958). See House Hearings 1357-1416, for
sample forms.
133. 76 Stat. 953 (1962), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1964); H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1960). Preservation of § 2 in the 1966 amendment has been
interpreted to indicate that banking monopoly can never be consistent with "public
interest." See S. Doe. No. 1698, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). No bank merger has
ever been held violative of § 2 of the Sherman Act.
134. Paragraph (7) of the amendment establishes a statute of limitations for
antitrust actions and no particular plaintiff is specified. The statute will run against
both governmental and private litigants. The wisdom of a statute of limitations is
reflected by problems of divestiture in bank merger cases. See Funk, Antitrust
Legislation Affecting Bank Mergers, 75 BncxNG L.J. 369. 381 (1958).
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In emergency situations, the interim between agency approval and
merger consummation may be reduced to five days. If one bank is
threatened with financial failure, merger may be effected immediately
and antitrust immunity is extended, except for section 2 suits.'-
Institution of a timely suit under paragraph (7) (A) automatically
suspends agency approval unless otherwise provided by the court.136
Courts must review issues de novo and apply the same substantive
standards applied by banking agencies under paragraph 5.137 Under
section 3 of the 1966 amendment, banks may renew merger applica-
tions formerly withdrawn due to Justice Department opposition.1
38
1. The Monopoly Standard of Paragraph 5(A).-Under paragraph
5(A) the jurisdictional agency may not approve "any proposed
merger transaction which would result in a monopoly or which would
be in furtherance of any combination or conspiracy to monopolize or
to attempt to monopolize the business of banking in any part of the
United States." The 1960 Bank Merger Act did not contain a
strict prohibition against approval of monopolistic mergers. Paragraph
5(A) states the illegality standard employed in section 2 and
strengthens considerably the monopoly standard embodied in the 1960
act.
2. The Competitive Standard of Paragraph 5(B).-The jurisdictional
agency may not approve "any other proposed merger transaction
whose effect in any section of the country may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or which in any
other manner would be in restraint of trade," unless the anti-competi-
tive effects are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the
135. See H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1966). Potential failure
of merging banks would probably be a valid defense to antitrust suits. 374 U.S. 321, 372
n.46 (1963).
136. The 1966 amendments provision permitting courts to lift an automatic stay of
agency approval is intended to deprive the Justice Department of absolute veto power
over most mergers. 112 CONG. RE c. 2539 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966). The burden of
proof rests with banks on motion to lift stay of approval. 112 CONG. lrEc. 2334
(daily ed. Feb. 8, 1966).
137. Representative Patman explained that the court is to make a decision "com-
pletely on its own," based upon evidence before it, and is not to give any weight to
agency determination. 112 CONG. RC. 2335 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1966). See also H.R,
EPs. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966). There is serious doubt whether this
statement reflects congressional intent as to the scope of judicial review of agency
approved mergers. See H.R. BEP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966): "[T]he
legal effects of the bill may be summarized as follows: (1) The bill would establish a
single set of standards for the consideration of future mergers by the banking agencies,
the Department of Justice, and the courts . . . which include both the effect of the
merger on competition and the convenience and needs of the community to be served,"
Representative Patman's statement would appear to open bank mergers to collateral
attack under antitrust laws reminiscent of Philadelphia.
138. H.R. BEP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966).
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convenience and needs of the community to be served. Pragmatically,"any section of the country" in which competitive effect is measured
should be co-extensive with "community to be served." Congress did
not intend to limit "community to be served" to that geographical
area within which state law would permit banks to establish
branches.139 In defining "community to be served," Senator Robertson
stated:
This means the entire area to which services are or could be supplied by the
proposed merged institution, and such area is of course not limited by
city, county or state geographical boundaries . . . ; the emphasis here
should properly be on the words 'to be served' . . .Artificial boundary
lines, branching areas limited in one way or another by the different States
have little or no significance.140
The phrase "may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend
to create a monopoly" is identical to section 7 of the Clayton Act; and
"in restraint of trade" is derived from section 1 of the Sherman Act.
This use of prior antitrust language was "not merely a coincidence";
it was intended to demonstrate that antitrust standards (relative to
competition) which have developed through judicial decisions are now
incorporated into the 1966 amendment.141 The 1966 amendments
legislative history indicates that the phrase "convenience and needs"
was adopted to alleviate "floundering" or "stagnating" banks and to
emphasize the importance of considering the acquired bank's service
to customers and the community generally. 142 The amendment does
not specify whether convenience and needs of the community must
totally outweigh any anti-competitive effect or need only reduce the
merger's overall impact below a substantial lessening of competition.
3. Relevant Market Standards.-Although established competitive
standards are utilized in the 1966 amendment, relevant market con-
cepts are changed substantially. Under antitrust theory, the relevant
market is composed of two elements: the product and services market
which is denominated by the phrase "line of commerce"; and the
geographic market which encompasses "section of the country'-I.e.,
139. 112 CoNG. REc. 2542 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966).
140. 112 CONG. REc. 2549-50 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966). Although Philadelphia
defined a four-county area in which branching was permitted as the "section of the
country," the logical extension of such a standard would limit competition to a single
city block in a unit (non-branching) state.
141. 112 CoNG. REc. 2337 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1966).
142. It was repeatedly stated during debates that one purpose of the amendment was
to permit elimination of inefficient banks, in order to improve service quality to
customers of the acquired bank. See 112 CoNG. REc. 2335, 2338 (daily ed. Feb. 8,
1966) (statements of Congressman Widnall and Congressman Reuss); House Hearings
14 (statement of William M. Martin).
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the area in which both companies operate and product interchange-
ability exists.143 Since merger validity may depend upon percentage
evaluations of market concentration, relevant market definition is
vital. Determining competitive effects of proposed mergers (as dis-
tinguished from the weight accorded it) involves factual inquiry
into market reality. 4
(a) Product Market.-Legislative history indicates that the Philadel-
phia Court's definition of product market as "commercial banking" is
expanded under the 1966 amendment to cover financial institutions
providing the same or similar services145 Criticism of the Supreme
Court's refusal in Philadelphia to include non-commercial banking
enterprises in the line of commerce was expressed in Congress. 4 In
spite of the legislative history, however, it is doubtful that the 1966
amendment has effectively changed the definition of line of commerce
143. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1961); United States v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1957). See also Mann & Lewyn, The
Relevant Market Under Section 7 of the Clayton Acts: Two New Cases-Two Different
Views, 47 VA. L. REv. 1014 (1961).
144. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra note 104; United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). Although no precise method of
measuring effects of mergers upon competition has been found, Bok, Section 7 of the
Clayton Act and The Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HAnv. L. REv. 226, 238-49
(1960), the per cent of market held by the resulting corporation considered with
respect to "the strength of the remaining competition" is an important factor. It is
therefore necessary to delimit the market in which change has occurred. United States
v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527 (1948).
145. Cf., Statement by Senator Robertson: "The text of paragraph (B) of the new
bill follows the terms of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, with the exception that the reference to 'any line of commerce' in the Clayton
Act is not carried over into the new bill. In this respect the new bill resembles the
Bank Merger Act of 1960, and calls for an apprasial of the overall effects of the
merger on competition, weighing increases of competition in one field against decreases
in competition in another field. The banking agencies and the courts .. . are not
intended and are not permitted to select some single, perhaps minor aspect of the
bank's business and to say that, because there is some lessening of competition in
this element of the business, the overall effects of the merger-the increase of competi-
tion in the entire field of banking and in the broader field of financial institutions
which may result from other aspects of the merger are irrelevant and may not be
considered." 112 CONG. Rc. 2541 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966).
146. See, e.g., 112 CoNG. REc. 2541 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966); 374 U.S. at 356-57
(1963). The Philadelphia Court acknowledged that other financial institutions supply
credit and hence are more or less in competition with commercial banks, (374 U.S. at
326 n.5), but the Court found commercial banks to be unique among financial in-
stitutions: "[Tihey alone are permitted by law to accept demand deposits. This
distinctive power gives commercial banking a key role in the national economy. For
banks do not merely deal in, but are actually a source of, money and credit; when a
bank makes a loan by crediting the borrower's demand deposit account, it augments
the Nation's credit supply. Furthermore, the power to accept demand deposits makes
banks the intermediaries in most financial transactions . . . . [B]anks are the chief
source of the country's short-term business credit." Id. at 326. For discussions as to
how line of commerce should be defined see Shull, Commercial Banking as a "Line of
Commerce," 1 NAT'L BANEnLc REv. 187 (1963); Note, 75 HAnv. L. Rnv. 756, 773-74
(1962). See generally KAYsExr & TuRNER, ANTruST POLIcY 131, 134-35 (1959).
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established in Philadelphia and Lexington. These cases analyzed
percentages of commercial bank assets, deposits and loans to make
an approximation of the "commercial banking business" controlled.
(b) Geographic Market.-In resolving section 1 and section 7
issues, acquisitions must be evaluated against competitive effects
within some particular area of the country. This geographic market
must be based on a "pragmatic factual approach and not a formal
legalistic one,"147 and must "correspond to commercial realities."
1'
The Philadelphia Court indicated relevant geographic market should
be based on geographic structure of the supplier-customer relation-
ship. 149 While section 7 prohibits mergers that have anti-competitive
effects "in any line of commerce in any section of the country,"
paragraph 5(B) forbids mergers "whose effects in any section of the
country" may be substantially anti-competitive. Under section 7, the
phrase "in any line of commerce- permits, in non-bank merger cases,
the testing of mergers in a sub-market of some broader area of com-
petition.150 Deletion of "in any line of commerce"'' 5 was intended to
require evaluation of the merger's overall impact on competition and
to implement the balancing process implicit in the 1966 amendment.
This will not exonerate anti-competitive mergers, but anti-competitive
effects in a sub-market will not defeat mergers otherwise beneficial to
the community. The achievement of uniform results depends upon
application of identical relevant geographic and product market
concepts by agencies and courts.
52
4. Balancing Factor of Paragraph 5(B).-If a proposed merger may
substantially lessen competition, it must be determined whether "the
anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly out-
weighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction
in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be
served." Senator Robertson stated that competitive factors must be
considered equally with convenience and needs of the community,
147. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336 (1961).
148. American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
149. 374 U.S. at 358. "In banking, as in most service industries, convenience of
location is essential to effective competition. Individuals and corporations typically
confer the bulk of their patronage on banks in their local community; they find it
impractical to conduct their banking business at a distance." See also Transamerica
Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 1953).
150. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 143, at 325.
151. Senator Robertson stated that omission of "in any line of commerce" was de-
signed to require appraisal of overall competitive effects. 112 CONG. Rlc. 2541 (daily
ed. Feb. 9, 1966).
152. 112 CoNe. REc. 2542 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966). See Handler & Robinson,




neither being decisive of merger legality.15 3 In authorizing a considera-
tion of benefits resulting from anti-competitive mergers, prior antitrust
law has been altered. 4 The basic policy that competition best serves
the convenience and needs of the community is reflected in the 1966
amendments requirement that merging banks establish benefits to the
community which "clearly outweigh" anti-competitive effects.' Under
a "convenience and needs" criterion, improved services through in-
creased size and efficiency are valid grounds for approving mergers.15
Financial and managerial services, and future prospects of existing and
proposed institutions are relevant in analyzing capacity to serve the
community. 157 Banks in failing, or precarious, positions may merge
with impunity since they would not be adequately serving community
needs and anti-competitive effects would be de minimis. Substantially
anti-competitive mergers, on the other hand, would not in all proba-
bility be in the public interest, and approval would be denied.'58
Although substantially anti-competitive mergers will not be ap-
proved, the amendment does not provide criteria for determining
whether "convenience and needs" clearly outweigh anti-competitive
harm. The antitrust basis against accumulation or exercise of market
power' 59 requires that the benefits of an anti-competitive merger be
substantial to justify agency approval.
5. Relevance of Competitive Factor When Merger Not Substantially
Anti-competitive.-The competitive factor is important even when
proposed mergers are not substantially restrictive of competition, thus
avoiding application of paragraph 5(A) or (B). Paragraph 5 does
not provide expressly for consideration of competition per se but
this is implicit in requiring consideration of community convenience
and needs. Paragraph 5 provides: "In every case, the responsible
agency shall take into consideration the financial and managerial
resources and future prospects of the existing and proposed institu-
153. 112 CoNG. REc. 2538 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1966).
154. See H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1966).
155. The burden of establishing that anticompetitive mergers would be in the
public interest is substantial. In presenting the amendment to the House, Representative
Patman stated that it was intended to place a "heavy burden" upon banks and any
exception to antitrust standards would "indeed be rare." 112 CONG. REc. 2334 (daily
ed. Feb. 9, 1966); see also H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1966).
156. See House Hearings 77, 521, 713. The argument was made in Philadelphia
that the resulting bank would better compete with New York banks for large business
and industrial loans because of increased lending limits.
157. H.R. REP. No. 1221, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1966). Present antitrust law
provides that an otherwise unlawful merger may be justified by proof of "the inade-
quate resources of one of the parties that may have prevented it from maintaining its
competitive position." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 143, at 346.
158. See Holland, Smith, Hall & Smith, Research Into Banking Structure & Com-
petition, 50 FED. REsEmvE BuLr.. 1383 (1964).
159. See KAYsE & TurNER., ANTrrUsT Poricy 44-45 (1959).
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tions, and the convenience and needs of the community to be
served."160
C. Additional Considerations
1. "Positive Repugnancy" of 1966 Amendment and Antitrust Laws.
-A strong argument could be made that antitrust language utilized
in the 1966 amendment was intended to reject court imposed
supremacy of antitrust principles. After incorporating anti-competitive
provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts in the amendment, the
act authorizes the balancing of competitive effects against "con-
venience and needs of the community to be served." If the latter out-
weighs the adverse effects upon competition (if any), a proposed
merger may be approved; and the court, in assessing merger legality
must apply "standards . . . identical with those that the banking
agencies are directed to apply under paragraph (5) ."161 This standard
is "the substantive rule of law" for bank mergers. 162
Under the reasoning of United States v. Borden Co.,16 when a sub-
sequent regulatory statute such as the 1966 amendment is "positively
repugnant" to antitrust laws, the latter must be superseded. The
positive repugnance of section 1 and section 7 with the 1966 amend-
ment is apparent. Attempting to reconcile a "substantive rule of law,"
under which public interest denominated as "convenience and needs
of the community" may outweigh adverse competitive effects, with
antitrust laws, under which courts "invalidate a merger found to
violate the antitrust laws even though it served the public interest,"1
is impossible. Since agencies now have authority to determine anti-
160. The competitive factor and convenience and needs factor were listed separately
in the 1960 Bank Merger Act as they are in paragraph 5(B) of the 1966 amendment.
161. Paragraph (7) (B) provides: "(B) In any judicial proceeding attacking a merger
transaction approved under paragraph (5) on the ground that the merger transaction
alone and of itself constituted a violation of any antitrust laws other than section 2
of the Act of July 2, 1890 (section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act 15 U.S.C. § 2),
the standards applied by the court shall be identical with those that the banking
agencies are directed to apply under paragraph (5)." 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (7) (B) (1965).
162. Section 2(c) of the 1966 amendment states: "Any court having pending before
it on or after the date of enactment of this Act any litigation initiated under the anti-
trust laws by the Attorney General after June 16, 1963, with respect to the merger,
consolidation, acquisition of assets, or assumption or liabilities of an insured bank con-
summated after June 16, 1963, shall apply the substantive rule of law set forth in
Section 18(c) (5) . 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1964), as amended, 80 Stat. 10 (Feb.
21, 1966).
163. 308 U.S. 188, 197-206 (1939). The Court in United States v. Manufacturers
Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) stated: "In United States
v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 197-206, the Court emphasized that when a later
regulatory statute, such as the Bank Merger Act (of 1960) shares common ground
with the antitrust laws, we should not resort to repeal of the antitrust laws by implica-
tion unless there is a 'positive repugnancy' and then only to the extent of the re-
pugnancy ....
164. United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., supra note 163, at 884.
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trust issues "as such" under the competitive standard of paragraph
5(B), their findings should be presumptively correct as to com-
petitive effects of proposed mergers. 165 Agency evaluation of the
competitive factors is guided by antitrust principles and, as stated
in Philadelphia, the traditional "failing company" doctrine, whereby
dangers to liquidity or solvency may be utilized as a defense to anti-
trust actions, might "have somewhat larger contours" as applied to
bank mergers.16
2. Weight of Banking Agencies' Decisions.-Significantly, in Phila-
delphia, Lexington and Manufacturers-Hanover, the courts admittedly
utilized standards separate from those applied by banking agencies to
test merger legality under the 1960 act.16 Agency findings on anti-
competitive effects of merger were not considered conclusive by
courts. The 1966 amendment directs courts to apply the same
standards employed by banking agencies.16 Since impartial agency
decisions are doubtful,169 courts should continue to re-examine the
weight which agencies accord to competitive factors of merger. This
supervision will avoid substantially anti-competitive combinations
which violate the public interest as well as the provisions of the 1966
amendment.
3. jurisdiction Over Stock Acquisitions.-The 1966 amendment pro-
vides that no insured bank may "merge or consolidate with any
165. Compare United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., supra note 163,
at 880.
166. 374 U.S. 370, 372 n.46. Under non-bank merger antitrust principles, Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930), established as a defense to § 7 of the
Sherman Act that if, before merger, "there being no other prospective purchasers,"
one of the firms "faced the grave probability of business failure." When the Clayton
Act was amended in 1950, Congress expressed approval of the "failing company
doctrine" and indicated intent to preserve it as a permanent principle of antitrust law.
See H. R. R P. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); S. REP. No. 1175, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1950). The Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine in United States v. Brown
Shoe Co., supra note 143.
167. See United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., supra note 163, at 881.
168. The Justice Department's limited knowledge of banking problems was recognized
by Congress: "[lit is clear that the Federal bank supervisory agencies have more
intimate knowledge of banking competition than any other agency of Government.
Yet, those who want the final word left up to the Justice Department would, in its
practical application, deny the public the expert knowledge these banking authorities
bring to bear on a bank merger case." 112 CONG. REC. 2338 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1966).
Likewise, Congressman Ottinger, an author of the 1966 amendment stated: "The
Justice Department has no real interest or expertise in applying banking factors, while
the agencies do." 112 CONG. REc. 2349 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1966).
169. Other agencies set up to regulate industries in the public interest have often
regulated in the industry's interest. See GEmoN & BYsE, ADMNNISTrATIVE LAW
1011-15 (4th ed. 1960). In the first action filed under the 1966 amendment, the
Comptroller indicated partiality toward the banking position. See Wall St. J., April 1,
1966, p. 5, col. 2.
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other bank or, either directly or indirectly, acquire the assets of, or
assume liability to pay any deposits made in, any other insured bank."
The Philadelphia Court stated that the 1960 Bank Merger Act "applies
only to mergers, consolidations, acquisitions of assets, and assumptions
of liabilities but not to outright stock acquisitions." 70 Congressional
intent is enigmatic as to whether one bank may acquire stock of
another and avoid regulation, 171 but since there is an established
distinction between assets and stock acquisitions it would appear that
the 1966 amendment leaves acquisitions by one bank of the stock
of another bank unregulated.
4. Agency Performance Under 1966 Amendment.-Paragraph 5
prohibitions apply only if anti-competitive effects are shown-a find-
ing the agencies have consistently failed to discern despite adverse
competitive reports by the Justice Department.'7" Since the phrase
"in any line of commerce" is deleted from the 1966 amendment, agency
discretion is greatly augmented: they may find anti-competitive
effects in one market offset by benefits in another; and when sub-
stantial anticompetitive effects are found, the balancing test may
immunize the transactions. Uniformity between banking agencies and
court decisions is fortuitous since standards are not provided to
determine whether: (1) there is a substantial lessening of competi-
tion; (2) benefits in one market offset harmful effects in another; and
(3) community benefits clearly outweigh anti-competitive effects.
Likewise, agency definition of relevant market is broad while courts
tend to apply a narrower market concept.
73
V. CONCLUSION
The 1966 amendment has failed to answer specifically the question
of whether, and to what extent, the antitrust laws should apply to
banking. Congress has chosen to rely upon vague concepts such
as the "community to be served," "competitive factors," "convenience
170. 374 U.S. 321, 344-45 n.22 (1963).
171. Under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, a holding company is defined
as one which "directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 25
percentum or more of the voting shares of each of two or more banks." 70 Stat. 133
(1956), 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a) (1) (1964). Acquisition of the voting shares of a single
bank might make the acquiring bank a "holding company affiliate" within the meaning
of § 2 of the Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162, as amended, 12 U.S.C. §
221a (1964), thereby requiring permission from the Federal Reserve Board to vote
the acquired stock.
172. Senate Hearings 16-17; House Hearings 187, 712.
173. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has considered services
available from sources other than commercial banks. "Non-banking financial institutions
are extremely active ... and provide a significant amount of competition for real
estate mortgage loans and installment loans. . . .Strong and effective competition will
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and needs," and "public interest." Unfortunately, these concepts
remain undefined. Agency discretion, in effect, is unlimited.
The significant changes from the 1960 Bank Merger Act are: (1)
agencies now decide antitrust issues per se, and (2) courts apply the
same substantive standards as the banking agencies. The substantive
standard is based on the balancing of competition against the con-
venience and needs of the community to be served. Merger approval
or rejection based on this test will assuredly depend upon to whom
the adjudicating task falls. Just as the three banking agencies disagree
among themselves as to standards of strictness,174 so the agencies and
the courts will tend to evaluate competitive effects with varying
degrees of emphasis. Courts will undoubtedly emphasize competitive
aspects of merger despite the admonition of section 2(c) of the
1966 amendment that identical substantive standards be applied by
courts and agencies. Furthermore, deletion of the words "in any line
of commerce" fails to indicate whether the Philadelphia definition of
"commercial banking" as the line of commerce remains applicable.
It is doubtful that the 1966 amendment will solve the myriad
problems involved in bank merger regulation. This may be attributed
to the reluctance of Congress to consider the underlying question of
competition versus regulation as the best method of maintaining a
sound banking system. A complete re-evaluation of the banking
regulatory structure is needed with a view toward establishing a
single final arbiter for merger adjudication. The dual authoritative
system of banking agencies and courts maintained under the 1966
amendment is inadequate.
continue to be maintained by a variety of banking and other financial institutions . . .
which offer a wide range of services to the residents and businesses of the com-
munity." West Branch & Trust Co., 49 FED. REsEavE ButLr. 1512, 1514 (1963).
See also Riverside Trust Co., 51 FED. REsERvE BuLL. 819 (1965).
174. See note 122 supra.
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